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ABSTRACT
The study of regional integration has become an 
essential topic of research in modern International Relations. 
Regional cooperation is the fundamental step leading towards 
regional integration. This thesis, using the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), as the case 
study, argues that political cooperation through elite rapport 
is a pre-condition for the success of regional cooperation. 
The South Asian case demonstrates that fruitful regional 
cooperation depends upon the presence of elite rapport.
REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA
INTRODUCTION
South Asia, cut off from the rest of the Asian land- 
mass by the Himalayan, Karakoram, Sulaiman and the Hindukush 
mountain ranges, constitutes a distinctive geographic 
region. The countries of this region share common 
historical, cultural and linguistic ties. The common 
heritage of colonial rule continues to shape South Asian 
politics.
Modern South Asia faces what at the surface seems to be 
insurmountable challenges rising from rampant poverty, 
rapidly growing populations, unemployment and low economic 
growth which are compounded by the presence of domestic 
conflicts rising primarily from secessionist movements. The 
South Asian region accounts for nearly 20 percent of the 
world*s population occupying only 3.3 percent of the earth’s 
surface area.1
In December 1985, the leaders of seven South Asian 
states convened for an unprecedented Summit at Dhaka, where 
they unanimously adopted a Charter for regional cooperation
xNirijan M.Khilnani, "India*s Political and Economic 
Policies Towards Her Neighbors,** Round Table 301 (January 
1987): 53.
2
in South Asia. After nearly five years of discussion and 
debate at the bureaucratic level, the leaders of Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
formally launched the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC), to promote cooperation to accelerate 
the development of the South Asian region. The birth of the 
SAARC gave rise to hopes that this organization would 
ultimately attenuate regional friction in South Asia, as 
well as promote development.
The increasing awareness of the interdependence of 
states has led to the development of the concept of regional 
cooperation and the creation of a number of regional 
organizations in different parts of the world. Most states 
of the world have realized the importance of cooperation 
with other states in similar conditions in a particular 
area.2 The formation of the European Community (EC) 
popularized the concept of regional economic cooperation. 
This growing faith in regionalism was further vitalized by 
the growth of a number of regional bodies like the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU). In Asia, the relative success of 
the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) acted as catalysts in the 
efforts to promote cooperation among the South Asian
2Atiur Rahman, Political Economy of SARC (Dhaka: 
University Press Ltd., 1985), 4-5.
4states.
South Asia, the region of intermittent border conflict, 
internal tensions and dubious bilateral relations since the 
end of colonial rule, had long been the only region in the 
world without a "rudimentary regional organization.1,3 The 
formation of the SAARC in 1985, raised hopes, especially 
among the regional intellectuals that this institution would 
help to resolve the longstanding, bitter regional disputes 
in South Asia. However, the SAARC has not been able to live 
up to these high expectations.
The SAARC at present is following the guidelines of the 
functionalist methods of regional integration.4 The 
principle belief underlying the functionalist approach 
adopted by the SAARC is that cooperation in economic and 
other so-called apolitical fields will promote cooperation 
among the member states and create a suitable atmosphere for 
the solution of the long-standing political conflicts within 
the region. No provision has been made for the discussion 
of political disputes, which for all practical purpose, have 
been excluded from the scope of the SAARC. Collective self- 
reliance of the region at large based on the promotion of 
mutual trust, amity and peaceful coexistence is the primary
3Imtiaz Bokhari, "South Asian Regional Cooperation: 
Progress, Problem, Potential and Prospects," Asian Survey 
Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1985): 371 citing Bharat Wariavwala, 
"Timid Search for Status," Seminar No. 256 (December 1980): 
22.
4See SAARC Charter (Appendix A).
5objective of the SAARC.
However, the present political discord in the region 
makes the concept of regional cooperation for economic 
development more an idealistic concept than a feasible one. 
In most third world states, and especially among the South 
Asian states, politics reigns supreme over economics. It 
seems to be the former that molds the latter. In South 
Asia, the process of nation-building continues and socio­
economic forces remain comparatively underdeveloped. Hence, 
political forces, nationality, sovereignty and strategic 
considerations, continue to be the primary forces guiding 
the destiny of the seven SAARC members.
Partha S. Ghosh argues that an indispensable element of 
regional cooperation is mutual rapport among elites of the 
states, which is practically absent in South Asia.5 The 
all-important presence of a "political will" which is 
imperative for the formation of regional cooperation is 
totally lacking among the SAARC members.6 What is very 
visible is the political discord and turmoil, with the 
antagonistic Indo-Pakistani relations being the centerpiece. 
The political tension in South Asia is augmented by the
5Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South 
Asia (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1989)> vii.
6Rajiv Kumar, "International Economy and Its Impact on 
the Asian-Pacific Region," in V.D.Chopra, M.Rasgotra and 
K.P. Mishra, eds., Asia-Pacific: Economic Potentials and 
Prospects (New Delhi: Continental Publishing House, 1988), 
74.
6acute fear of Indian hegemony which continues to influence 
the actions of the other SAARC members.
In essence, regional cooperation in South Asia has to 
be politically motivated. If SAARC is to succeed, the 
"contentious bilateral issues" which have been excluded from 
the scope of the Charter must be addressed. It seems quite 
impossible to expect the SAARC members to cooperate with one 
another while these disputes continue to exist. These 
disputed issues, supplemented by the lack of understanding 
among the regional elites, continue to mar the development 
of cooperation within South Asia.
This thesis consists of four chapters. The first 
chapter lays out the theoretical framework for regional 
cooperation in South Asia, including the main argument of 
this thesis, that successful regional cooperation depends on 
political cooperation. Political cooperation, in turn, has 
been elusive in South Asia, mainly due to the absence of 
elite rapport stemming from the congruence of political 
beliefs and common threat perceptions.
The second chapter provides a brief history of the 
evolution of regional cooperation in the South Asian region, 
highlighting both the intra-regional and extra-regional 
factors which impeded the development of a regional body for 
a considerable period of time. The chapter illustrates that 
divergent political beliefs and the absence of common threat 
perceptions retarded the development of regional cooperation
7in South Asia.
The third chapter, analyzing the inherent 
characteristics of the South Asian region, focusses on the 
different political and economic obstacles which have 
obstructed the progress of SAARC, and demonstrates the 
direct relationship between the preponderance of bilateral 
political conflicts and elite cooperation.
The fourth chapter reviews the proceedings of the five 
SAARC Summits. Focussing on the correlation between elite 
rapport and the level of success or failure of the Summits, 
this chapter, reveals the political character of these 
meetings. Power politics and strategic manouvering between 
India and Pakistan have been the principle feature of the 
Summits held so far.
The conclusion will once again reiterate the 
fundamental theme of this thesis, which is supported by the 
brief history of the SAARC: Elite rapport, a product of 
shared political values and common perception of threats, is 
a pre-condition of the political harmony necessary for 
successful regional cooperation.
CHAPTER 1
REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Theories of regional integration have become an 
integral part of the study of modern international 
relations.1 Regional cooperation is one of the primary 
steps leading to regional integration. This thesis puts 
forward the proposition that political cooperation, stemming 
from rapport among regional elites, is a pre-condition for 
the success of regional cooperation. Two elements promoting 
elite rapport are congruence in political beliefs and common 
threat perceptions. Contradicting the functional theory of 
integration, which emphasizes the importance of socio­
economic cooperation, this thesis will illustrate that at 
the formative stage of any organization promoting regional 
cooperation, political cooperation must precede economic 
cooperation rather than the reverse. The organization under 
consideration in this thesis is the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This chapter lays out the 
theoretical framework of the thesis.
theories of regional integration like federalism and 
functionalism have become essential components of any study 
of modern international relations.
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9THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION
At the outset, it is imperative that we define the term 
”region” and discuss whether South Asia can be considered a 
region, A region may be defined as "a particular geographic 
area of the world, the constituent states of which have 
shared historical, cultural and economic features and which 
in foreign affairs behave as interrelated units.”2 Cantori 
and Spiegel, in their study of the subsystems of the world, 
identified the South Asian region as a valid subsystem of 
states. They defined the South Asian region comprising 
India, which forms what Cantori and Spiegel call the core 
sector, and Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka, 
Maldives, Afghanistan and Burma, which they call the 
peripheral sector.3
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) consists of all these states except Sikkim, 
Afghanistan and Burma. The only additional member is 
Bangladesh which emerged from the former province of East 
Pakistan in 1971. Sikkim was incorporated as a state into 
the Indian Union in 1975. The founders of the SAARC 
overlooked Burma, as it has always maintained an
2Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South 
Asia (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1989); 7.
3Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, ”The 
International Relations of Regions,” in Richard A. Falk 
and Saul H. Mendlowitz, eds., Regional Politics and World 
Order (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1973), 
339.
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isolationist stance in international politics. The Soviet 
intervention and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan in 
1979, sealed its fate regarding membership of the SAARC in 
the formative years of the organization. However, since 
then the Kabul Government has shown enthusiasm over joining 
the SAARC and made an attempt to join the SAARC in 1987.
But the SAARC members except India, rejected the Afghan bid.
To summarize, geographically, historically and 
culturally, South Asia does indeed constitute a region, even 
though political disparities are great.
All the South Asian states share the same political 
background, i.e. the colonial past, but the post colonial 
state that emerged took very diverse forms. India and Sri 
Lanka functioned as democracies. Pakistan and Bangladesh 
went through phases of democratic and authoritarian regimes 
with the military playing prominent roles in both states. 
Nepal which for a long time remained under the authority of 
the monarch, witnessed the emergence of a more democratic 
' system in 1990. Bhutan remains a traditional monarchy while 
Maldives has a presidential system of Government.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
The concept of integration can be defined as "forming 
parts into a whole or creating interdependence.,,A Ernst
ARobert J. Lieber, Theory and World Politics 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop, 1972), 38.
11
Haas, a principle exponent of regional integration theory 
states that:
the study of regional integration is concerned with 
explaining how and why states cease to be wholly 
sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, 
and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual 
attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new 
techniques for resolving conflict between themselves. 
Regional cooperation, organizations, systems and 
subsystems may help describe steps on the way. but they 
should not be confused with the resulting condition.5
There is a lack of consensus among scholars about the 
scope of integration. Amitai Etzioni regards integration as 
a •'terminal" condition.6 Karl Deutsch, on the other hand, 
identifies integration as a "process leading to the creation 
of security communities."7
For this study of the South Asian model for regional 
cooperation, Morton Kaplan's definition of the integration 
process seems most suitable. Kaplan defines integration as 
"a process by which separate systems develop a common 
framework which allows for the common pursuit of some goals
5Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: 
Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pre-Theorizing," 
International Organization Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970): 
610.
6Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative 
Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1965), 6.
7Karl Deutsch, et al., eds., Political Community and 
the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957), 70.
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and common implementation of some policies.”8
In South Asia, the SAARC provides the framework for the 
implementation of policies intended for the development of 
some goals. The SAARC Charter states that the goal of the 
SAARC is the socio-economic development of the region and 
the promotion of peace and harmony based on mutual trust.9 
Haas' definition of regional integration does not seem to 
fit the South Asian model primarily because the SAARC 
Charter clearly states that there will be no infringement 
whatsoever on the sovereignty of the member states. Hence, 
Kaplan's definition is more appropriate to explain the South 
Asian case.
There is considerable confusion regarding the usage of 
regional integration and regional cooperation and an effort 
should be made to avoid the use of these terms 
interchangeably. Haas defines regional cooperation as, "a 
vague term covering any interstate activity with less than 
universal participation designed to meet some commonly 
experienced need.”10 The study of regional cooperation 
provides the data on the activities or beliefs of the 
principle groups involved, while the study of regional 
integration is more concerned with the "outcomes or
®Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International 
Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), 98.
9See Appendix A.
10Haas, 611.
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consequences of these activities for the region in 
question".11 Regional cooperation can be studied either as 
a part of regional integration or as a separate subject of 
its own. Regional cooperation maybe regarded as the means 
to the end, the end being regional integration. This thesis 
will use the term regional cooperation when discussing the 
SAARC, appropriate to its present state of development.
THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
There are numerous theories and interpretations of 
regional integration. This portion of the chapter will 
concentrate on reviewing four traditional theories of 
regional integration. These are: federalism, functionalism, 
neo-functionalism and communications theory.
Federalism constitutes the political and legal approach 
to integration. K.C. Wheare defines federation as an 
association of states which has been formed for certain 
common purposes, but in which the member states retain a 
large measure of their original independence.12 Federal 
theorists like Carl J. Friedrich, K.C.Wheare argued that the 
establishment of common institutions facilitate the "growth 
of common attitudes and a sense of community."13
11Ibid.
12K .C• Wheare, Federal Government (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1953), 1.
13Lieber, 39.
Federalists propagate the uniting of a set of political 
communities in a common order with limited infringement on 
their autonomous status.14 They are concerned with the 
constitutional approach advocating the formulation of 
written constitutions specifying the division of powers 
among the various constituent units.
Functionalism emphasizes the preeminence of socio­
economic factors over the political factors in forging 
regional cooperation. Functionalism "attempts to identify 
common international economic and social problems and create 
regional or global organizations to deal with them."15 
This would lead to a "conglomeration of border-crossing 
organizations" which would ultimately control every facet of 
the socio-economic life.16 The underlying belief is that 
the establishment of socio-economic ties, it would lead to 
the solution of other problems as well. The emphasis is on 
the "spill-over" effect. Functionalism would "overlay 
political divisions with a spreading web of international 
activities and agencies, in which and through which the 
interests and life of all the nations would gradually be
14Ibid.
15Charles A.Duffy and Werner J. Feld, "Wither Regional
Integration Theory?" in Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd, ed. 
Comparative Regional Systems: West and East Europe. North 
America. The Middle East and Developing Countries(New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1980), 500.
16Ibid.
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integrated.1117 The essence of functionalism is that step- 
by-step economic decisions are superior to crucial political 
choices.18
Neo-functionalism developed primarily out of the 
criticism of functionalist theory. Neo-functionalist theory 
evolved in the 1950s with the implementation of the Schuman 
Plan which led to the formation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community.19 Ernst Haas* writings form the core of 
neo-functionalist literature. Haas put forward the 
proposition that as "pressure groups begin to organize 
across national boundaries in order to be able to influence 
policy decisions that were once the monopoly of national 
Governments, but that now come under the purview of 
supranational institutions, group pressures spill over into 
the federal sphere and thereby add to their integrative 
impulse.1,20
The neo-functionalists, unlike the functionalists, 
recognize the role of the political actor in the integration 
process. Haas defines neo-functionalism as the process 
whereby political actors "shift their loyalties,
17David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1946) 14.
18Lieber, 42.
19A.P.Rana, "Regionalism As An Approach to 
International Order: A Conceptual Overview," International 
Studies Vol. 18, No. 4 (October-December 1979): 523.
2°Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1958), xxxiii.
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expectations or political activities towards a new and 
larger center, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”21
Karl Deutsch*s communications approach defines 
integration using the security community approach. He 
believes that integration among countries may be attained 
through the establishment of relationships which build 
strong community spirit and this sense of community will 
prevent future warfare among the states.22 Deutsch divided 
the communities formed into two categories. The amalgamated 
community, where all the independent units formed a single 
union, and the pluralist society where the states retain 
their separate Governments and their legal sovereignty.23 
Deutsch enumerated fourteen conditions which help in the 
formation of these communities. However, he stressed two 
indispensable conditions necessary for the formation of both 
amalgamated and pluralist communities: compatibility of 
major values and mutual responsiveness.2A
According to Deutsch, compatibility of major values 
means, "that no value will be considered important in the 
relations between political units unless it is important 
within each of them, and is considered important in their
21Ibid., 16.
22Deutsch, 5.
23Ibid., 6.
2AIbid., 123-129.
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common relations."25 Mutual responsiveness was "a matter 
of perpetual attention, communication, perception of needs 
and responsiveness."26
The functionalist school emphasizes economic factors 
while Deutsch's two essential conditions for the creation of 
security committees are political in character.
MODERN APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
The 1970s saw a revision in the study of regional 
integration. Ernst Haas admitted that traditional 
integration theories were reaching a state of 
obsolescence.27 He urged the revision of these theories in 
order to explain the modern phenomena of regionalism which 
were not following any of the paths predicted by the 
classical theories. Haas advised that the study of regional 
integration should be subordinated to the study of the 
changing patterns of interdependence.28
Modern theorists, after observing the functioning of 
diverse regional bodies, have come to the conclusion that 
certain conditions are necessary for the success of regional 
cooperation. Partha Ghosh argues, rather like Deutsch, that
25Ibid., 123.
26Ibid. , 129.
27Ernst B. Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of 
Regional Integration," International Organization Vol. 30,
No. 4 (Spring 1976): 208.
28Ibid.
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the essential element for regional cooperation is rapport 
among the regional elites. Shared security concerns and 
similar political perspectives form the basis for this 
rapport.29
Mohammed Ayoob, after studying the EC, the ASEAN and 
the GCC, comes to the conclusion that the indispensable 
factors for the success of regional cooperation are 
political and strategic rather than economic in nature.30 
He states that in the initial stages of any regional 
organization promoting cooperation, political cooperation 
has to precede economic cooperation. Ayoob lists the 
factors as:
1) common and similar threats which forms a congruence
in security perceptions.
2) congruence in political perceptions.
3) congruence in strategic perceptions.
4) a consensus regarding the role of the pivotal power
within the regional grouping, a consensus shared by the
pivotal power itself.31
Ayoob*s four conditions indicate the importance of 
elite rapport by emphasizing the importance of congruence in 
security, political and strategic power perceptions.
This emphasis on elite cooperation by both Ghosh and
29Ghosh, vii.
30Mohammed Ayoob, "The Primacy of the Political: South 
Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) in Comparative
Perspective,” Asian Survey Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1985): 445.
31Ibid.
19
Ayoob may be traced back to Deutsch's security community 
approach which accentuated the compatibility of values and 
mutual responsiveness among the regional elites as crucial 
conditions necessary for the success of regional 
integration.
This emphasis on the primacy of political factors can 
be found in the works of many political theorists. 
Contradicting the traditional functionalist approach, which 
emphasized the importance of economic cooperation, these 
authors stress the necessity of political cooperation in 
bringing about cooperation within a region.
Jacob Viner, in his classic study on the Customs Union, 
argues that cooperative economic arrangements are the 
outcome of "political and security" considerations rather 
than mere economic considerations.32 The preeminence of 
political relations shaping the economic framework has been 
argued by Robert Gilpin in his work on the effects of the 
multinationals as independent actors in international 
relations. Gilpin states that, "politics determines the 
framework of economic activity and channels it in the 
directions which tend to serve the political objectives of 
dominant political groups and organizations".33
32Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1950), 92.
33Robert Gilpin, "The Politics of Transnational Economic 
Relations," in Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg, ed., 
Globalism versus Realism: International Relations1 Third 
Debate (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1982), 176-177.
20
Constantine Vaitsos, in his analytical study of Latin 
American economic integration contends that regional 
cooperation Mcalls for a significant role to be played by 
the member countries' governments and the viability of the 
process is subject to a continuous commitment and 
manifestation of political support."34
These scholars clearly believe that regional economic 
cooperation has to be preceded by some kind of political 
collaboration among the regional elites. Improved elite 
relations are imperative for economic cooperation. Economic 
ties established through political cooperation, in turn, 
reinforce the political cooperation already established. 
Peter G. Peterson comments that, "improvement in political 
relationships is a pre-requisite for improved economic 
relationships, but once in place, economic ties create a 
community of interests which in turn improve the environment 
for further progress on the political side."35
CONCLUSION
South Asia constitutes a viable region of the world, 
for the purposes of this analysis. Classical integration 
theorists have endeavored to explain the growth of regional
34Constantine Vaitsos, "Crisis in Regional Economic 
Cooperation (Integration) Among Developing Countries: A 
Survey," World Development Vol. 6 (June 1978): 719.
35Peter G. Peterson, US-Soviet Commercial Relations in 
a New Era (Washington D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1972),
3.
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organizations. However, they have not been able to account 
for the success or failure of these cooperative bodies. At 
present more interest has been shown in the study of 
regional cooperation rather than that of regional 
integration.
Karl Deutsch, Partha Ghosh and Mohammed Ayoob have 
emphasized that for the success of regional cooperation, 
certain pre-conditions are necessary. Propounding the pre­
eminence of political cooperation, they state that elite 
cooperation is the primary pre-condition for the successful 
operation of any scheme of regional cooperation. This elite 
cooperation stems from the presence of congruent political 
perspectives and from common threat perceptions. Hence, for 
regional cooperation to succeed, political and strategic 
cooperation has to usher in economic cooperation and not the 
reverse.
The proposition put forward in this thesis is that 
political (including strategic) cooperation must precede 
economic cooperation for the successful implementation of 
any scheme of regional cooperation. Political cooperation 
depends on cooperation and understanding among the regional 
elites. Using the SAARC as a case study, the following 
chapters of this thesis will argue that the rise and fall of 
regional cooperation in South Asia can be explained by the 
presence or absence of elite rapport and political 
cooperation.
CHAPTER 2
EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) was inaugurated in 1985. It has endeavored to 
promote regional cooperation in the conflict-ridden South 
Asian sub-continent. The roots of this movement for 
regional cooperation can be traced back a long way. Several 
abortive attempts by Nehru and other statesmen preceded the 
final successful scheme proposed by President Ziaur Rahman 
of Bangladesh in 1980. Tracing the evolution of regional 
cooperation in South Asia, this chapter illustrates that the 
lack of rapport among the regional elite, stemming from the 
absence of corresponding political perspectives and common 
strategic perceptions, delayed regional cooperation in South 
Asia.
EARLY ATTEMPTS
The history of regional cooperation in South Asia can 
be traced to ancient times. Neither man nor a state can 
survive in absolute isolation. The necessity for self
22
23
preservation promotes interrelations.1 States often 
"cooperated” with one another in order to attain some common 
goal. These early ventures were strategic in nature, with 
rulers of different kingdoms and principalities forming 
alliances to either ward off foreign invasions or to fight 
amongst themselves to preserve territorial integrity.
The ancient epic, the Mahabharata, provides a vivid 
account of the battle (estimated to have taken place around 
1000-700B.C.) between two Aryan tribes. The Kauravas and 
the Pandavas formed extensive alliances with other tribes to 
establish their control over the northern parts of the sub­
continent.2 In 327 B.C., King Porous tried unsuccessfully 
to unite the local princes in order to prevent Alexander's 
invasion of the north-western parts of the Indian 
subcontinent.3
Later on, time and again, the Rajput princes and other 
Hindu rulers endeavored to put aside differences and 
cooperate with one another to stem the Muslim invasion of 
India. In 1191 A.D., Rajput princes rallied under the 
leadership of Prithvi Raj Chauhan to defeat the Muslim
XT.B. Mukherjee, Inter-State Relations in Ancient India 
(Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967), 46.
2Romila Thapar, A History of India: Volume T 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966) , 3.1.
3J. Allan, Sir T.Wooseley Haig and H.H. Dodson, The 
Cambridge Shorter History of India (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1934), 24.
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conqueror, Muhammed Ghori.4 From the sixteenth century 
onwards, with the conquest of South Asia by the European 
powers, most of these cooperative alliances aimed at ending 
foreign rule and re-establishing indigenous regimes.
In the twentieth century, the earliest call for Asian 
regionalism came from the Japanese who raised the slogan, 
"Asia for the Asians."5 However, the Japanese invasion of 
Southeast Asia proved that this call was motivated more by 
imperial ambition rather than any idealistic plans of 
regional cooperation.
On the sub-continent, leaders of the Indian 
Independence movement supported this concept of pan-Asian 
regionalism enthusiastically, especially to end colonial 
rule in the continent. Many Indian leaders reiterated this 
idea of forming an Asian Federation.6 In August 1945, 
Jawaharlal Nehru stated, "I stand for a South Asian 
Federation of India, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Burma."7 
Nehru and other leaders of the Indian National Congress 
believed that cooperation with the neighboring countries 
would be a critical element in the preservation of India's
4Thapar, 236.
5S.D. Muni and Anuradha Muni, Regional Cooperation in 
South Asia (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984), 10.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., citing, J.S. Bright, ed., Before and After 
Independence: Collection of Nehru's Speeches 1922-1950 
(New Delhi, 1950).
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security interests and for the socio-economic development of 
the country.8
British rule on the Indian sub-continent ended in 1947. 
The British left behind not one but two states within the 
sub-continent using the religion-based "two nation theory” 
to divide pre-independent India. The Islamic state of 
Pakistan was created from parts of British India. Partition 
and the emergence of Pakistan created two hostile forces on 
the sub-continent. Both India and Pakistan sought the help 
of extra-regional powers to help maintain the equilibrium 
within the region. Pakistan, fearing re-absorption within 
Hindu India's rule, actively sought alliances with the 
Islamic states in West Asia and other Western powers. India 
turned, at various times, to both the Soviet Union and the 
United States when her security interests were threatened.
The post-Second World War period saw the formation of a 
number of cooperative bodies in Europe, as strategic 
alliances paved the way for economic cooperation among the 
European states. The war-devastated European countries 
realized that mutual cooperation would not only be of 
strategic importance but would also help in the economic 
recovery of the region. Inspired by the European efforts at 
regional cooperation, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime
8S.D. Muni, "India's Political Preference in South 
Asia: A Study in India's Responses to Systematic Changes in 
the Region," India Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 1 (January-March 
1976): 23.
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Minister of independent India, attempted to popularize the 
concept of regional cooperation in the South Asian region 
which at that period included not only the sub-continent but 
also Southeast Asia. Nehru*s vision of Asia included both 
the political and economic integration of the region.9
From 1950 onwards, several conferences were held by 
both South and Southeast Asian states for the promotion of 
economic and technological cooperation. These included the 
Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947, the Colombo 
Powers Conference in 1954 and the Bandung Conference of 
Afro-Asian states in 1955. These conferences proved to be 
mere fora for discussions and deliberations? no concrete 
plans of action for cooperation evolved from them.
Nehru, a fervent supporter of regional cooperation, 
actively preached the benefits of cooperation among the 
South Asian states. In collaboration with Bandarnaike of 
Sri Lanka, he formed the Asian Relations Organization to 
promote cooperation within the region in 1947.10 Despite 
the lack of support from the other states of the area, Nehru 
continued to promote his ideas for the formation of a 
regional cooperative body, but lack of support finally 
forced him to dissolve the unofficial Asian Relations
9R .V .R . Chanderasekhara Rao, "Regional Cooperation in 
South Asia," Round Table 293 (January 1985): 54.
10Muni and Muni, 12, citing Sisir Gupta, India and 
Regional Integration in South Asia (Bombay: Asia Publishing 
House, 1964), 37.
27
Organization in 1957.11
A principle reason for the failure of Nehru's endeavors 
was the change in the political environment of the region 
with the advent of Cold War politics. Nehru himself charged 
the United States with introducing Cold War politics in 
South Asia.12 Most of the newly independent states 
actively participated in the emerging alliance systems 
chiefly to obtain aid for the development of their 
economies. Cold War politics divided the Asian states into 
opposing camps, totally embroiled in bloc politics.
In Asia itself, Pakistan, China and other smaller 
powers opposed Nehru's attempts at forging regional 
alliances, in an attempt to thwart what they considered to 
be increasing Indian dominance of the region. In fact, the 
budding rivalry between India and China led to the 
cancellation of the Second Asian Relations Conference in 
Nanking in 1949.13
By the mid 1950s, the first wave of enthusiasm for 
regional cooperation had come to an end. By this time 
however, Southeast Asia had developed a distinct regional 
identity of its own shaped mainly by security
11Ibid.
12Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "American Policy in South Asia: 
Interests and Objectives, " in Stephen Cohen, ed., The 
Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives 
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987),
122.
13Muni and Muni, 15.
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considerations.14 The South Asian region, now consisting 
of the Indian subcontinent and other neighboring countries 
(Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Burma) remained merely a 
geographic expression.
THE COLD WAR ERA
South Asian regionalism suffered a setback in 1955 when 
Pakistan joined the US sponsored Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO) and the South-East Asian Treaty Organization 
(SEATO). Pakistan with her perpetual fear of Indian 
expansion, joined the alliances to secure foreign help in 
the event of an Indian attack.15
India, on the other hand, joined the newly-emerging 
non-aligned movement and non-alignment soon formed the core 
of Indian foreign policy. The non-alignment advocated by 
Nehru had its roots in the concept that power politics 
causes war and that the pursuit of peace meant keeping free 
of alliances with Superpowers.16 Nehru realized that 
remaining non-aligned would be the best course of action for 
India, allowing her to obtain aid from both the blocs.17
14Rao, 57.
15Cheema, 121.
16Sauripada Bhattacharya, The Pursuit of National 
Interests Through Neutralism: India*s Foreign Policy in the 
Nehru Era (Calcutta: Firma KLM Private Ltd., 1978), 5-15.
17Ahmed A Kadeer, “The Concept of Non-Alignment and Its 
Impact on South Asia," Pakistan Horizon Vol. 34, No. 3 
(1981): 42.
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The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 further reinforced this 
widening rift in the foreign policy orientations of the two 
major South Asian powers.
The late 1960s however, saw the emergence of another 
wave of regionalism within South Asia.18 Increased U.S. 
involvement in the region prompted the Soviet Union to make 
some efforts to promote cooperation and extend its influence 
within the region.19 The growing awareness in the benefits 
of economic cooperation was fostered by the activities of 
the UNCTAD and other regional commissions established by the 
U . N .20
In the mid 1970s, the South Asian states underwent 
massive internal political upheavals. 1977 proved to be the 
year of political "upsets” in the region. In India, the 
newly formed Janata Party defeated the Congress Government 
led by Mrs.Indira Gandhi. In a major coup, General Zia-ul- 
Haq toppled the Government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto in Pakistan. In Sri Lanka, President Jayawardene 
took over from Mrs. Bandarnaike. In Bangladesh, President 
Ziaur Rahman firmly established his power by 1978, filling 
in the vacuum created by the assassination of Sheikh Mujibar 
Rahman in 1975.
Economic conditions in South Asia contributed to the
18Muni and Muni, 17.
19Ibid., 18.
20Ibid., 19.
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political turmoil. Low economic growth and high population 
growth adversely affected the regional economy.21 The 
failure of the North-South negotiations, forced these states 
to consider once again and perhaps more seriously, the 
possibility of cooperating within the region to alleviate 
the wretched living conditions of their respective 
populations.22
THE BANGLADESH PROPOSAL
The final attempt at the promotion of regional 
cooperation was made by President Ziaur Rahman of 
Bangladesh. In 1979, President Rahman visited the other 
South Asian states and proposed his scheme for regional 
cooperation in South Asia. Encouraged by the responses of 
the other South Asian states, the Bangladeshi President 
formulated the Bangladesh Proposal of 1980, regarded as the 
genesis of the present South Asian Regional Cooperation 
(SARC).
The question that rises is what motivated President 
Ziaur Rahman to pursue this scheme for regional cooperation. 
There is no doubt that the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in 1979 did play a significant role in 
accelerating the development of regional cooperation within
21Pramod Kumar Mishra, South Asia in International
Politics (Delhi: UDH Publishers, 1984), 79.
22Muni and Muni, 23.
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South Asia. In Bangladesh, leftist sections of the media 
alleged that President Ziaur Rahman had been influenced by 
the U.S. under the Carter Administration. In fact, they 
accuse the Bangladesh Proposal of being a mere "echo” of the 
Carter Doctrine of January 1980.23
On 2 3 January 1980, the U.S. President Jimmy Carter in 
his State of the Union address, outlined the Carter Doctrine 
which in view of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, 
emphasized the necessity of a cooperative security framework 
in South and South-West Asia.24 U.S. officials were sent 
to "persuade" the South Asian states to "evolve a regional 
approach" within the region.25 The Gulf Cooperation 
Council institutionalized regional cooperation in South-West 
Asia. In South Asia, President Zia issued the 1980 proposal 
which contained broad outlines for a scheme for regional 
cooperation.
President Zia's Proposal caused mixed reactions in the 
region. While Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives 
appeared enthusiastic about the proposal of regional 
cooperation, the two major players of the South Asian arena, 
India and Pakistan, remained apprehensive. In 1980, Mrs.
23S.D. Muni, "Political Imperatives," in Bimal Prasad 
ed., Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Problems and 
Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1989), 40, 
citing Holiday Weekly (Dhaka) 15 June 1980.
24S.D. Muni, "SARC: Building Regionalism From Below," 
Asian Survey Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1985): 394.
25Ibid.
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Gandhi returned to power in India. Her Government exhibited 
skepticism over accepting a scheme which they felt was 
covertly being sponsored by the United States.26 The 
Indian Government also feared that this would probably allow 
Pakistan and the other South Asian nations to "gang up" 
against India.27 On the other side, the Government of 
Pakistan remained apprehensive about the possible Indian 
domination of the organization and the benefits of economic 
cooperation which could very well lead to the Indian 
domination of the regional market.28
At the onset, despite their lukewarm reactions, neither 
the Indian nor the Pakistani Governments completely rejected 
the Bangladesh Proposal. India felt that rejection of this 
proposal would definitely undermine its regional policy.29 
However, they sought to modify the proposal in order to 
accommodate their respective fears and apprehensions.
PRELIMINARY STEPS TO REGIONAL COOPERATION
As a result of the Bangladesh Proposal, a series of 
talks took place between the regional and the extra-regional 
powers. The Foreign Ministers of the concerned states met
26Ibid., 395.
27Salamat Ali, "In ASEAN*s Footsteps," Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 5 December 1985, 44.
28Muni, "SARC: Building Regionalism from Below," 396.
29Ibid.
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in New York in September 1980.30 They decided to hold a 
meeting of the Foreign Secretaries to discuss the initial 
arrangements which would then be followed by a meeting at 
the Ministerial level and finally the Summit sessions with 
the Heads of Government. The unanimous decision reached at 
New York was to exclude the bilateral and controversial 
issues from the agenda of the initial talks.31 Bangladesh 
assumed the responsibility of preparing the initial draft 
proposal for the first meeting.
Bangladesh sent its working paper on regional 
cooperation to the other nations in November 1980. The 
paper reemphasized the importance of cooperation for the 
economic development of the region as a whole and reiterated 
the hope that "a shared heritage in the region in terms of 
commonness in ethnicity, language, religion, history and 
culture would serve as a unifying factor by minimizing 
bilateral differences.”32 The areas of cooperation 
proposed were telecommunications, meteorology, transport, 
shipping, tourism, agricultural research, joint ventures, 
market promotion, educational and technical cooperation and 
cultural cooperation.33
30Muni and Muni, 34.
31Ibid. , 35.
32Pramod Kumar Mishra, "Towards A Framework of South 
Asian Regional Cooperation: Colombo to Kathmandu," Foreign 
Affairs Report Vol. 21, No. 12 (December 1982): 214.
33Ibid. , 216-217.
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The first meeting of the Foreign Secretaries was held 
in Colombo in April 1981. At this meeting, the group 
undertook the task of identifying the areas of cooperation. 
The Indian delegation expressed apprehension about 
discussions of bilateral political issues which might lead 
to the criticism of domestic policies and exert undue 
pressure on India.34 Their Pakistani counterpart voiced 
reservations about the rapid institutionalization of 
regional cooperation.35 The areas of cooperation agreed in 
Colombo included agriculture, rural development, 
telecommunications, weather and environmental implications, 
and health and population control. However, the Joint 
Communique issued after the meeting clearly stated that 
"bilateral and contentious issues" were to be excluded from 
the scope of these regional forums.36
Study Groups were set up to investigate the five areas 
of cooperation. Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka had the responsibility of coordinating these groups. 
The Study Groups had to make definite recommendations at the 
next meeting to be held at Kathmandu. A Committee of the 
Whole, consisting of representatives of all the seven states
34Emajuddin Ahamed, SARC-Seeds of Harmony (Dhaka: 
University Press Ltd., 1985), 16.
35Mishra, 219.
36Ahamed, 16.
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was set up to consider other areas of cooperation.37
The second meeting of Foreign Secretaries, held at 
Kathmandu in November 1981, added four more areas of 
cooperation to the agenda. These included communication and 
transportation? sports, arts and culture? postal service? 
and scientific and technical cooperation. The existing 
Study Groups were converted into Working Groups and were 
entrusted with the task of drawing up comprehensive programs 
in the long and short term phases. The immediate action 
program would include activities such as the exchange of 
data and information, exchanges involving experts and 
training facilities, and the organization of seminars and 
workshops on a regional basis. The long term program of 
action included the assessment of needs and resources, 
preparation of specific projects of regional nature and the 
modalities for financing the projects.38
The third conference of the Foreign Secretaries was 
held in Islamabad in August, 1982. It ended on a very 
positive note as the states expressed their faith in the 
concept of regional cooperation. The participants 
unanimously decided that the next meeting would be at the 
ministerial level. In the interim period, two meetings held
37Mishra, 220.
38From SARC to SAARC; Milestones in the Evolution of 
Regional Cooperation in South Asia (1980-1988); Vol I 
(Kathmandu: South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation, 1988), 23.
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in Dhaka (March 1983) and New Delhi (April 1983), formulated 
the guidelines to be discussed in the first meeting of the 
Foreign Ministers.
In August 1983, the Foreign Ministers of the seven 
states met at New Delhi to inaugurate the South Asian 
Regional Cooperation (SARC).39 Endorsing the decisions 
reached at the previous meetings and formulating the SARC 
Declaration, the member nations once again confirmed their 
faith in the viability of SARC. The SARC finally emerged 
from the conceptual stage to the pragmatic, realistic stage 
with definite principles and defined programs of action.
Further meetings held at the Ministerial level at Male 
in July 1984 and in Thimpu in May 1985 settled the framework 
of regional cooperation in South Asia. These preparatory 
stages paved the way for the first summit of the Heads of 
Government of the seven member states.
THE FIRST SAARC SUMMIT
In December 1985, the heads of Government of 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka, met in Dhaka and adopted the Charter which formally 
institutionalized SARC with the formation of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This was 
indeed a momentous occasion in the conflict-torn history of
39The South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) was 
institutionalized in 1985 with the formation of the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
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South Asia. The seven leaders reaffirmed their commitment 
to accelerate the socio-economic development of the region 
through mutual cooperation.
The formation of the SAARC was heralded all over South 
Asia. The intellectual community, in particular, showed 
optimism and faith about the success of the SAARC. The 
world-wide reaction was mixed. Though lauding the efforts 
of the South Asian states, there was widespread general 
skepticism about the efficiency and success of such a 
movement in a region plagued by extreme tension and ill- 
feeling with long-standing unresolved political problems.
CAUSES FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE BANGLADESH PROPOSAL 
The fundamental cause for the success of the 
Bangladesh Proposal (as opposed to those attempted by Nehru) 
lies in the fact that the 1980 proposal came from a 
secondary power and not either of the two major powers in 
South Asia. Nehrufs initiatives failed mainly because the 
other nations, primarily Pakistan, refused to accept any 
plans of cooperation conceived by India, which they felt 
might very well be intended to disguise Indian hegemonic 
ambitions.
The smaller states of the region enthusiastically 
supported the movement. The relative success of the EC, the 
ASEAN and other regional bodies provided the much needed 
incentive to organize and promote regional cooperation.
India and Pakistan hesitated initially, but ultimately 
accepted the proposals. The relations of the Congress 
Government of Mrs. Gandhi and the post-Mujib regimes of 
Bangladesh had never been very cordial. Mrs. Gandhi showed 
skepticism over accepting a Bangladeshi scheme of 
cooperation.40 Hence, the Indian reaction was very 
cautious. A spokesman for the Foreign Office declared on 22 
May 1980, that India accepted the Proposal in principle, but 
restricted only to economic cooperation.41 However, from 
1981 onwards India changed its stance and showed greater 
enthusiasm for regional cooperation. India concurred in the 
end because she calculated that supporting the movement 
would build her image within the South Asian region and also 
raise her international prestige.42
Pakistan remained doubtful about the efficacy of this 
proposal for regional cooperation. A leading Pakistani 
daily observed that the existence of bilateral disputes and 
the absence of a common political purpose would restrict 
regional cooperation to a consultative forum.43 Pakistan
40Rao, 57.
41M.B.Naqvi, "South Asian Cooperation,” Pakistan Horizon 
Vol. 36, No. 3 (1983): 21.
42Dilip Bobb, "South Asia: Sphere of Suspicion,” India 
Today, 15 October 1983, 63.
43Muni, ”SARC: Building Regionalism from Below,” 396,
citing Dawn (Karachi), 29 May 1980.
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agreed after some covert persuasion by the U.S.4*
President Zia's Proposal owes its success to strategic 
timing and the politico-economic environment of the region 
at the times.
CONCLUSION
While the rest of the world made rapid progress towards 
regionalism, South Asia until 1983, remained a geographic 
expression torn apart by bilateral conflicts augmented by 
distrust among the regional elites. The evolution of 
regional cooperation in South Asia clearly demonstrates that 
lack of common political perspectives and strategic 
perceptions slowed the development of regional cooperation 
within the region. Diverging political orientations of the 
political elites of the two major powers, India and 
Pakistan, alienated them from one another.
“Ali, 44.
CHAPTER 3
OBSTACLES TO REGIONAL COOPERATION: BILATERAL FRICTION
The birth of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC), heralded all over the world, gave rise 
to hopes that this organization would ultimately reduce 
regional friction in South Asia. However, the progress of 
the SAARC has been hampered by the "contentious" bilateral 
relations among the states in this region. This chapter 
analyzes the basic characteristics shaping the political and 
economic environment of the South Asian region which have 
led to discord among the regional elites. The chapter also 
demonstrates that divergent political orientations have led 
to a multitude of political and economic problems in the 
region, and that these problems arise primarily in the 
bilateral relations between India and the other South Asian 
states.
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION
The two basic characteristics of the region are
40
41
Indocentrism and "asymmetrical power structures."1 The 
whole South Asian region is Indocentric in nature: 
geographically, culturally and to a certain extent 
economically.2 The Partition of British India in 1947 
created the two principle states of the South Asian region- 
India and Pakistan. East Pakistan broke away from West 
Pakistan in 1971 and formed the state of Bangladesh. All 
the other states in the region have common land and maritime 
borders with India (but not with each other) and their old 
ties with British India formed the foundation of their 
relations with the present Indian state.
The second characteristic of the South Asian region is 
the asymmetrical power balance. India's superiority within 
the region can be discerned by comparing its "size, 
population, resource-base, potential for growth, military 
strength and viability of the constitutional and political 
system" with any other South Asian state.3 Consequently, 
South Asia must be regarded as India-dominated.
These two characteristics have led to political and 
economic problems. Nearly all the bilateral political 
disputes within the region have one common element— India. 
These problems, some concerning boundary issues while others
^.D.Muni, "India and Regionalism in South Asia: A 
Political Perspective," International Studies Vol. 17, No. 
3-4 (July-December 1978): 487-488.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.,486.
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involving ethnic crises or the sharing of common resources, 
rise primarily from the Indocentric nature of the sub­
continent. Within the region, the dominating presence of 
India is the main stumbling block to economic cooperation, 
as the other nations fear Indian domination of their markets 
and subsequently of their economies.
POLITICAL PROBLEMS
Political discord is the legacy of the years of 
colonial rule in this region.4 The genesis of the "South 
Asian sub-system of states,” the 1947 Partition of India, 
generated and since then has maintained the hostile 
relations between the two largest countries of the region, 
India and Pakistan.5 The two bi-products of this Partition 
are the disputed boundaries and the presence of ethnic 
minorities in the different South Asian states.6 
Independence from colonial rule broke up the integrated 
regional economy and each state began to pursue independent 
economic policies and grew more and more alienated from
4Pramod Kumar Mishra, South Asia in International 
Politics (Delhi: UDH Publishers, 1984), 2.
5Bhabani Sen Gupta, Amit Gupta and Prakash Nanda,
"Regionalism in South Asia: Roles and Behavior,” in 
Bhabani Sen Gupta ed. Regional Cooperation and Development 
In South Asia (Volume I): Perception. Military and Nuclear 
Arms (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986), 18.
^uni, 482.
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continuing intra-regional trade.7 The 1947 Partition laid 
the foundation of the growing mistrust among the regional 
elites.
Political problems in South Asia stem from the question 
of national integration compounded by the nation-building 
and developmental processes in the different states.8 The 
power disparities within the region are accentuated by the 
presence of different kinds of political structures. S.D. 
Muni states that cooperation is also dependent on "elite 
coalitions" and stresses the role of "constructive and viable 
coalitions of the ruling elites on the sub-continent."9 The 
present political discord in South Asia may be attributed to 
the lack of such elite coalitions.
India is central to the region and India•s contiguous 
boundaries with other countries lead to the dominance of 
bilateral rather than multilateral relations. India has 
common boundaries with Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh and 
shares maritime boundaries with Sri Lanka and Maldives. None 
of the other member states share common boundaries with one 
another. As a result, bilateralism is the principle mode of
7Mishra, 2.
8Muni, 491.
9Ibid., 499.
interaction within the sub-continent.10
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INDIA AND PAKISTAN
The centerpiece of South Asian politics is the Indo- 
Pakistani relationship. The fragile balance of regional 
cooperation will always rest on this "hypersensitive 
fulcrum.”11 Partition of the country based on the two 
nation theory which emphasized the differences between the 
Hindus and the Muslims, led to the creation of Pakistan in 
1947. Bloody communal riots preceded the 1947 Partition of 
the country and led to the dislocation of thousands of 
people. This Partition forms the foundation of the Indo- 
Pakistani rivalry. The mutual suspicion of the Hindus and 
the Muslims did not recede after 1947. The creation of 
Pakistan on the sub-continent "transformed the inter- 
communal fight into an inter-state conflict."12 The 
fundamental justification for the existence of Pakistan, the 
creation of a Muslim homeland for the Muslims in the old 
undivided Indian state, runs directly at odds with the 
modern Indian emphasis on a secular state. In fact, the
10S.D.Muni and Anuradha Muni, Regional Cooperation in 
South Asia (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984), 56.
11Srinivas Prasad, "SAARC: Painful Progress," India 
Today. 15 December 1986, 65.
12Gowher Rizvi, "The Rivalry between India and 
Pakistan," in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, ed., South Asian 
Insecurity and the Great Powers (New York: St. Martin*s 
Press, 1986), 96.
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hostility between the two states stem from the opposing 
concepts of an Islamic state and a secular state.13
Territorial conflicts between the two states have led 
to three wars and numerous border skirmishes since 1947.
The bone of contention between the two states is the 
possession of Kashmir. In 1947, the Hindu Maharajah of the 
Muslim majority province of Kashmir, after initial 
hesitation, joined the Indian Union. Pakistan, on the other 
hand, felt that Kashmir being a Muslim dominated province, 
rightfully belonged to Pakistan and this liberation of 
Kashmir became the focal point of Pakistani domestic and 
international politics.
The first Indo-Pakistani War broke out in 1947 when the 
Maharajah of Kashmir joined the Indian Union. At the time 
of Partition, the different princely states were given the 
option of either joining India or Pakistan. The Maharajah 
of Kashmir, Hari Singh, remained undecided. In fact, Hari 
Singh harbored plans of forming his own independent 
state.14 However on 22 October 1947, several hundred 
tribesmen from Pakistan stormed into the western part of 
Kashmir heading towards the capital, Srinagar.15 In 
desperation, the Maharajah, appealed to India for help. The
13Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia 
(New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1989), 18.
14Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War In South Asia 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 17.
15Ibid. , 18.
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Indian Government insisted on accession to the Indian Union 
as a pre-condition for extending any help. The Maharajah 
joined the Indian Union on 27 October 1947. The very next 
day, Indian forces landed in Kashmir and began full scale 
operations against the Pakistani infiltrators.16
The war continued until U.N. mediation finally brought 
about a cease-fire in January 1949.17 By this time, India 
controlled nearly two-thirds of Jammu and Kashmir with only 
one-third remaining under Pakistan.18 This episode marked 
the beginning of the most hostile bilateral issue to plague 
the region. Kashmir, the picturesque valley in the 
Himalayas, has turned out to be a battleground between the 
two adversaries, India and Pakistan.
The second Indo-Pakistani War began in 1965. This was 
preceded by border skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch region.
In response to Pakistani infiltrations into Kashmir, Indian 
forces crossed over the 1949 cease-fire line and launched 
full-scale operations against Pakistan. This war proved to 
be quite a setback for Pakistan.19 Indian forces 
penetrated beyond Kashmir and reached the outskirts of 
Lahore. The Tashkent Conference of 1966 followed the U.N. 
sponsored cease-fire. According to the Tashkent
16Ibid.
17Ibid.
18Buzan and Rizvi, 99.
19Ganguly, 89.
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negotiations, the Indian forces went back to their 
previously held positions, with the 1949 cease-fire line 
being reinforced.
The 1965 war led to the acceleration of the rivalry 
between India and Pakistan. Pakistan feared that India was 
trying to undermine its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. This fear proved to be well-founded. In 1971, 
Indian and Pakistani forces clashed once againy this time in 
East Pakistan. The 1971 war led to the break-up of Pakistan 
and the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh from 
the old province of East Pakistan.
The Indo-Pakistani rivalry also launched an arms race 
between the two states. The scale tipped in India's favor 
after its 1974 explosion of a nuclear device. This event 
sparked Pakistan's fervent attempts to acquire nuclear 
technology to build the "Islamic Bomb."20
In the late 1980s, Kashmir re-emerged as a source of 
friction. Kashmiri separatists have taken up arms against 
the Indian government, demanding independence. They remain 
undecided about joining Pakistan or creating their own 
state. At present, Kashmir still remains a trouble-stricken 
area with escalated violence between the Indian troops and 
the Kashmiri separatists.
Allegations about overt Pakistani support for the
20Ashwini K.Ray, "Pakistan's Post-Colonial Democracy: 
Implications for Indo-Pakistani Relations," Economic and 
Political Weekly. 22 April 1989, 867.
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Kashmiris and the Sikh separatists in Punjab, has 
exacerbated Indo-Pakistani discord. Amanullah Khan, one of 
the leaders of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF), revealed that from 1986 onwards the Pakistani 
Government of General Zia-ul-Haq sponsored and operated 
terrorist training camps.21 Pakistan, on the other hand, 
has accused India of supporting the Sindhi nationalist 
movement in Pakistan.22
Possession of the Siachen glacier has led to 
intermittent clashes between the two nations. Both India 
and Pakistan claim sovereignty over this glacier. This 
situation deteriorated from 1984 to such an extent that it 
has been referred to as a "cryogenic bomb which could ignite 
a major war between India and Pakistan.”23 The territorial 
dispute in the Siachen is based on divergent interpretation 
of the watershed principle as a guideline for demarcating 
boundaries in mountainous regions. Pakistan opposes the 
Indian occupation of the Saltoro ridge in the Siachen.24 
Clashes in 1987 led to prolonged skirmishes between the 
armed forces at Siachen and aroused belligerent sentiments
21A .G . Noorani, "The Kashmir Question," India Today. 30 
June 1990, 61.
22William L.Richter, "Mrs. Gandhi"s Neighborhood:
Indian Foreign Policy Toward Neighboring Countries," Journal 
of Asian and African Studies Vol. 22, No. 3-4 (1987): 251.
23Raminder Singh, "Breaking the Ice," India Today. 15
July 1989, 79.
24Ibid.
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in both nations.25
Indo-Pakistani relations have become a crucial issue in 
the internal politics of the two countries. Compromising on 
Kashmir means political suicide for the politicians of both 
nations. Benazir Bhutto initially endeavored to harmonize 
the relations with India. Opposition parties accused her of 
bending to Indian pressures. Nawaz Sharif, the present 
Prime Minister, accused Benazir of having accepted "Indian 
supremacy."26 In a sincere bid to garner political 
support, Benazir reversed her earlier position and played 
the "Kashmir card" quite effectively.27 A "Kashmir policy" 
is a must for all electoral campaigns. Mir Ghous Bux 
Bizengo, a Pakistani politician states that in Pakistan, 
"India-baiting still commands both votes and support."28
In India too, Kashmir has become an integral part of 
the domestic political arena.29 "Nothing unites the 
Indians more than the determination to hold Kashmir."30
25Salamat Ali, "Smoothed-Over Summit," Far East 
Economic Review. 19 November 1987, 41.
26Shekhar Gupta, "Benazir's Acid Test," India Today. 15 
July 1989, 76.
27Shekhar Gupta and Mushahid Hussain, "Benazir Under 
Siege," India Today. 31 August 1990, 15.
28Shekhar Gupta, "Fourth SAARC Summit: Coming of Age," 
India Today. 31 January 1989, 26.
29Madhu Jain, "Turning Bitter," India Today. 15 
February 1990, 11.
30James Clad, "India: A World at War with Itself," The 
Washington Post. 31 March 1991, B3.
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Hence, no political party can hope to survive by espousing 
independence for Kashmir. This desire to hold on to Kashmir 
stems from the belief that to let Kashmir go would lead to 
the Balkanization of the Indian state.31
Political problems have affected economic relations 
between the two states as well. Government restrictions are 
imposed on the movement of goods and people between the two 
nations. Each state has spent a major portion of its GNP 
stockpiling weapons to ward off aggressions from the other. 
In 1988-89, the Pakistan defence budget was 27.6 percent of 
its GNP ($2,240 million).32 Across the border, the Indian 
Government allotted 12.1 percent ($9,980 million) of its GNP 
to the defence sector.33
This highly sensitive and often explosive relationship 
between India and Pakistan, a legacy of the colonial past 
continues to be the key issue hampering the development of 
regional cooperation in the South Asian region.
INDIA AND BANGLADESH
After the 1971 war, Bangladesh maintained excellent 
relations with India. Indian support for the liberation of 
Bangladesh was appreciated and Indian patronage was sought
31Ganguly, 45.
32Thomas J. Timmons, ed and comp., U.S. and Asia 
Statistical Handbook (Washington D.C.: Heritage 
Foundation, 1989), 63.
33Ibid. , 35.
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by Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujibar Rahman, the Bangladeshi 
leader, maintained close ties with India. From 1975 
onwards, public discontent with Sheikh Mujib*s corrupt 
administration translated into the development of anti- 
Indian sentiments and discomfort with the "yoke” of Indian 
patronage.34
The deterioration of Indo-Bangladesh relations may be 
attributed to the Ganges water dispute, the South Talpatty- 
New Moore Island conflict and the illegal immigration of 
Bangladeshi nationals to India.
The long-standing dispute between India and Bangladesh 
over the sharing of the Ganges water intensified with the 
completion of the Farrakka barrage in 1975, in the Indian 
state of West Bengal. This barrage diverted nearly 40,000 
cubic meters of water per second through a link canal to 
prevent the silting of the River Hoogly and the Calcutta 
port.35 Bangladesh objected to this diversion of Ganges 
water on the ground that it would jeopardize the navigation 
and irrigation systems of Bangladesh and harm the 
cultivation of crops.
Bangladesh has proposed the construction of storage 
dams at the main tributaries of the Ganges in the Indo- 
Nepalese borders and the inclusion of Nepal to the sharing
34Richter, 253.
35Ghosh, 86.
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of Ganges water scheme.36 India contends that this 
dispute, being strictly bilateral, should not include a 
third party and proposed the construction of a link canal 
connecting the Brahmaputra to the Ganges. Bangladesh 
opposed the Indian proposal, on the grounds that this would 
cause flooding of prime agricultural land, the dislocation 
of hundreds of peasant families, and would create a natural 
barrier between the northern provinces and the lyther parts 
of Bangladesh.37 In Bangladesh, this water dispute has 
been politicized and has been used to promote anti-Indian 
sentiments. Government statements and news editorials often 
resound with "anti-India tirades."38
South Talpatty island or as the Indians call it the New 
Moore Island, is an uninhabited island in the Bay of Bengal. 
Both India and Bangladesh claim ownership of the island, 
which was formed after a cyclone in 1970.39 This disputed 
claim is inter-linked to the conflict over the "delimitation 
of sea zones" and is compounded by the conflicting 
interpretations of the Law of the Sea formulated in 1982.A0
36M.Rafiqul Islam, "The Ganges Water Dispute: An 
Appraisal of a Third Party Settlement," Asian Survey Vol. 
27, No. 8 (August 1987): 925.
37Ibid. ,924.
38Raminder Singh, "The Siege Of Dhaka." India Today. 15 
December 1987, 69.
39Habibur Rahman, "Whose is South Talpatty Island?" Asian
Profile Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1987): 439.
A0Ibid.
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This controversial question of defining maritime boundaries 
is also a contentious issue in Indo-Bangladesh 
relations.41
The influx of refugees into Calcutta gave India the 
pretext for entering the 1971 war. However over the years 
the continuous flow of illegal Bangladeshi nationals into 
India, especially into the state of Assam, has led to 
serious disputes between the two states. The Bangladeshi 
Government has turned a blind eye to this problem. This 
continuous flow of Bangladeshi nationals into Assam led to 
unrest among the Assamese. The fear of being reduced to 
minority status in their own state inspired the Assamese to 
agitate for the recognition of their language and claim 
preferential treatment for employment.42 In order to check 
this flow of Bangladeshi refugees into India, the Indian 
Government started to fence the Indo-Bangladeshi border near 
Assam.43 Controversy at the Governmental level of the two 
nations over the "barbed wire" fence even led to exchange of 
fire among the troops guarding the respective borders.44
Despite the looming presence of these bilateral 
problems, Bangladesh and India have on numerous occasions
41Ibid., 440
42Sanjib Baruah, "Immigration, Ethnic Conflict and 
Political Turmoil: Assam 1979-1985," Asian Survey Vol. 26, 
No. 11 (November 1986): 1190.
43Ghosh, 84.
44Ibid. , 85.
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cooperated on various issues like telecommunications, trade 
and even border rectifications.45 The long-standing 
problem over the lease of Tin Bagha region in West Bengal 
was resolved with the "perpetual lease" of the Tin Bagha 
area of India to Bangladesh.46 The disputes between India 
and Bangladesh, though essentially economic in nature, have 
become embroiled in domestic and regional politics of the 
region and at present pose serious obstacles to the 
prospects of regional cooperation.
INDIA AND SRI LANKA
The activities of the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka 
led to adversial relations between India and Sri Lanka. The 
issue included the fate of the thousands of Tamil refugees 
coming into India. Some of them were the "Stateless" Indian 
Tamils who had been taken to Sri Lanka by the British to 
work as plantation workers. Large numbers of Indian Tamils 
were denied Sri Lankan citizenship after the independence of 
Sri Lanka. But most of the refugees coming to India are the 
Jaffna Tamils fleeing the violence of terrorist activities 
in the northern Tamil-dominated provinces of Sri Lanka.
In the 1980s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealem 
(LTTE) escalated their violent activities against the Sri
45Richter, 254.
46P.K.S.Namboodiri, "India and Bangladesh: A New 
Beginning," Strategic Analysis Vol. 6, No. 8 (November 1982): 
461.
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Lankan Government. The violence unleashed against the LTTE 
in retaliation by the Sri Lankan armed forces raised the 
sympathy of the Tamils in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.
The Government of Tamil Nadu under the rule of Chief 
Minister M.G. Ramchandran, extended open support and aid to 
the LTTE and provided a base of operation for the Tamil 
militants against the Sri Lankan forces.47 Influenced by 
the Tamils in India, the Indian Government officially sent 
humanitarian aid to the besieged provinces of Jaffna in 
1987.48
Despite allegations and counter-accusations, the Sri 
Lankan and the Indian Governments signed the Indo-Sri Lankan 
Accord on 29 July 1987. The Accord introduced an Indian 
Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to maintain peace and stability 
in the Jaffna peninsula. The temporary truce in Jaffna soon 
gave way to a protracted struggle between the IPKF and the 
LTTE. Very soon, the presence of the IPKF was resented by 
all sections of the Sri Lankan population, as they felt that 
the Tamil problem was essentially an internal matter. Sri 
Lanka, under the Premadasa Government, brought to power by 
the elections of 1989, demanded the withdrawal of the IPKF
47S.U.Kodikara, "Regional Roles and Behavior in South 
Asia: A Theoretical Framework of Regional Cooperation," in 
Bhabani Sen Gupta, ed., Regional Cooperation and Development 
in South Asia (Vol 1): Perception, Military and Nuclear Arms 
Race Problem (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986), 47.
48P.Venkateshwar Rao, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka," 
Asian Survey Vol. 28, No. 4 (April 1988): 433.
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from Sri Lanka. The Indian government initially refused, 
claiming that the withdrawal would escalate the violence.
Sri Lanka responded by refusing to host the 1989 SAARC 
Summit to protest against the presence of the IPKF.
Finally, in January 1990, the IPKF withdrew from Sri Lanka 
but the scars of the political battles still remain. 
Bilateral problems between these two states affected the 
SAARC and increased regional apprehension about Indian 
"hegemony" within the region.
INDIA AND NEPAL
Nepal*s relations with India have gone through both 
positive and negative phases. The Chinese occupation of 
Tibet in 1950 led to the strengthening of Nepalese ties with 
India. The Indo-Nepalese Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
extended Indian influence in Nepalese internal and external 
affairs.49 The fundamental basis of Indo-Nepalese 
relations is economic in nature. Being a land-locked state, 
Nepal is totally dependent on India for trade and transit. 
Nearly 50 percent of Nepal's trade is with India and the 
remaining trade overseas is done under the Transit treaty 
with India.50
Indo-Nepalese relations gradually deteriorated over the
49Ashraf, 16.
50N .P.Banskota, "Nepal: Towards Regional Economic 
Cooperation in South Asia," Asian Survey Vol. 21, No. 3 (March
1981): 344.
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years, especially in the 1980s. India resented Nepal's 
seeking ties with China. India refused to endorse Nepalese 
King Birendra's 1973 proposal for the creation of a zone of 
peace. The Chinese and the Pakistani Governments promptly 
endorsed the peace proposal, further arousing Indian 
suspicion about this zone of peace.51
In 1987, Nepal for the first time required work permits 
for Indians working there. The Nepalese Government also 
imposed an extra 55 percent customs duties on imports from 
India.52 India protested against these actions. The 
Indian Government pointed out that Article 7 of the 1950 
Treaty granted equal treatment for the citizens of both 
states. The work permits discriminated against the Indian 
citizens thereby violating the provisions of the 1950 
Treaty.53
In 1989, Indo-Nepalese relations took a hostile turn 
with the lapse of the trade and transit agreement between 
the two states.54 The Nepalese Government refused to 
accept the Indian demand for a single trade and transit 
treaty. India retaliated by closing all but two of the
51Lok Raj Baral, "Nepal's Security Policy and South 
Asian Regionalism," Asian Survey Vol. 26, No. 11 (November 
1986): 1207.
52Ramindar Singh, "Towards Estrangement," India Today. 30 
April 1989, 70.
53Ibid.
54Anirudha Gupta, "India-Nepal Discord," Economic And 
Political Weekly. 22 April 1989, 853.
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fifteen transit points on the Indo-Nepalese border leading 
to acute shortages of essential commodities in Nepal.55 
After considerable deliberation, enmity and adversial 
relations between them, the two states finally came to an 
agreement over the trade and transit issues. However, Nepal 
still remains wary about increased Indian influence over its 
internal and external affairs.
BHUTAN AND MALDIVES
Indo-Bhutanese relations have been very cordial 
primarily because Bhutan is dependent on India for its very 
survival. The Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1949 stated that 
Bhutanese foreign policy would be guided by India.56 India 
continues to provide substantial aid to the Bhutanese. 
However, over the years, the Bhutanese have grown to resent 
this dependence on India and have now established 
independent relations with China and several other 
countries. The relations with China have caused problems 
with India. But on the whole, Bhutan has maintained cordial 
relations with India and other South Asian states.
The Republic of Maldives consists of 12,000 islands in 
19 groups south-west of India in the Indian Ocean. Its 
population is predominantly Muslim.57 Maldives has cordial
55Ibid.
56Richter, 255.
57Ashraf, 20.
59
relations with all other South Asian nations including 
India. In November 1988, a coup in the capital, Male was 
crushed with the help of the Indian army.58
BILATERAL RELATIONS AND ELITE RAPPORT
Partha Ghosh has cited elite rapport as a pre-condition 
for the success of regional cooperation. In South Asia, 
relationship among the regional elites have had a dramatic 
effect on bilateral relations. Mrs. Gandhi's aggressive 
foreign policy (1966-1977) alienated most of the regional 
elite except Sheikh Mujibar Rahman of Bangladesh. During 
the short term of Sheikh Mujib's rule (1971-1975), Indo- 
Bangladesh relations were extremely cordial. This 
cordiality primarily grew out of the close personal 
friendship between Mrs. Gandhi and Sheikh Mujib.59
The Janata Government's (1977-1980) foreign policy, as 
articulateded by Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, 
emphasized the necessity of improving relations with the 
neighbors.60 Prime Minister Morarjee Desai met Bangladeshi 
President Ziaur Rahman in 1977 and reached a mutually 
acceptable agreement over the Farakka water sharing
58Madhu Jain, "An Idyllic Friendship,” India Today. 15 
February 1990, 41.
59Mishra, 152.
60Naveed Ahmad, "Recent Developments in Indian Foreign 
Policy," Pakistan Horizon Vol. 33, No. 3 (1980): 49.
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issue.61
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, signed by Sri Lankan 
President Jayawardene and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi, is another example of elite cooperation leading to 
congenial relations. However, lack of understanding between 
the Rajiv Gandhi and the succeeding Sri Lankan President, 
Premadasa, led to new friction over the presence of the 
IPKF.
The initial rapport between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir 
Bhutto led to the success of the 1988 SAARC Summit at 
Islamabad and Indo-Pakistani discord took a turn towards 
harmony. But soon, Ms. Bhutto succumbed to domestic 
political pressure and adopted a much harder policy towards 
India, especially regarding Kashmir and Siachen.
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
A major obstacle to the growth of regional cooperation 
in South Asia is the wide disparity in size, population, 
economic resources and development between India and the 
other member states. India has 77 percent of the total 
population and 72 percent of the total land area of the 
region. She has 84 percent of the arable land, 69 percent 
of the irrigated land and nearly 90 percent of all the
61Ibid., 70.
61
available resources.62
Another major obstacle is the similarity of trading 
patterns. India and Pakistan compete in three of the four 
major categories of Bangladeshi exports, while India 
competes in eight of Pakistan's ten categories of 
exports.63 Import categories also reveal similarities with 
more than 50 percent of the imports of India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh.64
Economic cooperation remains hampered by the looming 
presence of the comparatively large Indian economy in the 
South Asian region. The other SAARC members feel that 
unregulated trade within the region, especially with India, 
will hurt their newly emerging industries.65 As a result, 
most states have imposed trade barriers and other 
restrictions. In these developing nations, governmental 
policies regulating trade activities are interrelated to the 
political relations. In Pakistan, severe administrative
62M.L. Qureshi, Survey of Economic Resources and Prospects 
of South Asia (Colombo: Lotus Press Ltd., 1981), 7.
63Syedur Rahman, "Issues and Agenda for South Asian 
Regional Cooperation: A Bangladeshi Perspective," Asian 
Survey Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1985): 414, quoting Principle 
Export Commodities. External Market-1981 Statistical 
Yearbook (New York, 1982).
64Ibid., quoting "Imports by Broad Economic Categories," 
UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York,
1982) .
65Imtiaz H. Bokhari, "South Asian Regional Cooperation: 
Progress, Problem, Potential and Prospects," Asian Survey 
Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1985): 386.
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restrictions curb trade with India.66 In South Asia, where 
the Governments control every sector of the economy either 
directly or indirectly through licensing and other such 
devices, the establishment of socio-economic ties seem 
impossible in the midst of political tension.
Most of the states are seriously concerned with the 
adverse balance of payment situation. Therefore, most of 
the SAARC states are reluctant to reduce trade barriers.67 
The loss of extensive customs duties impedes the progress of 
trade liberalization in this region.68 Lack of 
Infrastructural linkages have affected the development of 
economic cooperation within the region.69
ECONOMIC POTENTIAL
There is scope for regional cooperation in the economic 
sphere. One should remember that forty-four years ago, the 
South Asian region formed part of an integrated colonial 
economy. Scholars have suggested different ways in which
66Rehman Sobhan, "The Economic Background," in Bimal 
Prasad ed., Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Problems and 
Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1989), 27.
67T.P. Bhatt, "Cooperation For Economic Development," in 
M.S. Agwani, et al., ed., South Asia: Stability and Regional 
Cooperation (Chandigarh: Center for Research in Rural and
Industrial Development, 1983), 38.
68Ibid.
69Indra Nath Mukherjee, " Economic Constraints and 
Potentialities," in Bimal Prasad, ed., Regional Cooperation 
in South Asia: Problems and Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House, 1989), 101.
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economic ties could be re-established. Principle among them 
are the schemes for hydro-electric cooperation between 
India, Nepal and Bangladesh.70
Syedur Rahman, has suggested the formation of 
cartels for primary commodities like tea and jute.71 These 
cartels would then help in price stabilization and reduce 
regional friction at the international markets. Other 
cooperative schemes include the sharing of man-power 
resources, the potential mineral resources of the Himalayas 
and in the sea-bed region surrounding the South Asian 
region.72
CONCLUSION
Bilateral friction in South Asia has become embroiled 
in the domestic politics of the individual states. The 
Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir forms the centerpiece of 
South Asian bilateral friction. This conflict has led to 
three wars and endless number of skirmishes between the two 
nations. The liberation of Kashmir is the cornerstone of 
Pakistani foreign policy and holding on to Kashmir is
70B.G. Verghese, "River Waters: Doubts Hamper 
Agreements," in M.D. Dharamdasani, ed., South Asian 
Regional Cooperation: An Exercise in Open Diplomacy 
(Varanasi: Shalimar Publishing House, 1985), 159.
71Rahman, 416.
72B. Satyanarayana, "Regional Economic Cooperation for 
South Asian Countries," in K. Satyamurty, ed., South Asian 
Regional Cooperation (Hyderabad: Institute of South Asian 
Studies, 1982), 57-58.
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imperative to the Indian political elite. Any compromise 
from either side means political suicide.
The history of bilateral relations show that these 
relations can improve or worsen depending on the rapport 
among the regional elites. The 1971 Shimla Agreement 
between Mrs. Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan 
ameliorated the Kashmir problem and established a line of 
control agreed to by both parties. But, soon this 
transitory rapport disappeared and Indo-Pakistani discord 
reemerged in full force, after the 1974 explosion of the 
Indian nuclear device.
The South Asian region is besieged by the presence of 
long-standing political and economic problems which are the 
results of the inherent characteristics of the region 
itself. Indocentrism and Indo-domination remain the two 
principle and intrinsic features of the South Asian region. 
This has led to the proliferation of bilateral problems 
among India and her neighbors. These bilateral problems 
amplified by elite discord affected and continue to affect 
the progress of the SAARC.
CHAPTER 4
SAARC AT WORK: THE SAARC SUMMITS
The SAARC Charter stated that the members would hold 
annual Summits to discuss and review the activities of the 
organization. The first Summit was held in Dhaka in 1985 
and was followed by four other Summits held in Bangalore, 
Kathmandu, Islamabad and Male. This chapter summarizes the 
proceedings of these annual Summits from Dhaka to Male, 
highlighting the correlation between elite rapport and the 
relative success and failure of these Summits. The chapter 
focusses on the discord between India and Pakistan and the 
effects of this relationship on the progress of regional 
cooperation within the region.
THE DHAKA SUMMIT-1985
The Dhaka Summit convened in December 1985 formally 
launched the SAARC. The Charter signed by the member states 
laid down the objectives of the SAARC. These objectives 
include the following: to promote the quality of life, 
accelerate economic growth and provide the opportunity to 
all to live in dignity; to strengthen collective self- 
reliance and contribute towards building mutual trust; to
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promote active collaboration in the economic, technical and 
scientific fields including cooperation with other 
developing countries and international forums with similar 
aims and purposes; and finally to increase people to people 
contacts and information between the states of the region.
The principles of the Charter stated that cooperation 
shall be based on "respect for principles of sovereign 
equality, territorial integrity, political independence, 
non-interference in internal affairs of other states and 
mutual benefit."1 The Charter further stated that 
cooperation should not only be consistent with bilateral and 
multilateral agreements but should also complement them.2 
Each member state had the veto power and all decisions 
required unanimity.3 The SAARC however, excluded all 
"bilateral and contentious issues" from the scope of its 
Charter.4 The different bodies formed to carry out the 
SAARC activities included the Technical Committee and the 
Action Committee. The Standing Committee formed included 
the Foreign Secretaries of the member states and had the 
responsibility of coordinating and monitoring the whole
1B.D. Dangol ed., SAARC Vovaae From Dhaka to Bangalore 
(Kathmandu: Ministry of Education and Culture, Department of 
Archeology, 1987), 68.
2Ibid.
3Keesinq's Contemporary Archives. Vol. 32, No. 3 (March
1986), 34243.
4Ibid.
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program of action. The financial arrangements were on a 
voluntary basis with each country deciding on the amount of 
its contribution to the SAARC.5
The member states agreed to cooperate in different 
areas including transport, telecommunications, postal 
services, meteorology, health and family planning, 
agriculture and sports.6 Apart from cooperating in 
specific areas, the members also recognized the need for the 
development of a common view on issues such as the "North- 
South economic dialogue and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade(GATT) policy."7 The leaders at the Summit 
concurred to cooperate in formulating stringent measures to 
counter terrorism and drug-trafficking within the region. 
They emphasized the necessity of frequent meetings at the 
ministerial and bureaucratic levels, and decided to meet at 
annual Summits to discuss and review the progress of the 
organization.8
The Dhaka Declaration, though praised as a laudatory 
effort to establish cooperation in South Asia, has also been 
subject to criticism. Even though all the seven leaders 
made long speeches in Dhaka proclaiming the need for
5Dangol, 70.
eFacts on File. Vol. 45, No. 2352 (20 December 1985),
947.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
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cooperation and mutual trust, they ensured the exclusion of 
bilateral and contentious issues from the authority of the 
SAARC. Unanimous decisions and the veto power took care of 
the Indian fear of the domination of the organization by 
Pakistan and other smaller states and vice versa.
The main rationale behind the SAARC was to establish 
some form of economic cooperation among the South Asian 
states for the development of the region at large. However, 
trade and industry have been deliberately left out of the 
scope of the SAARC Charter, mainly to overcome the fear of 
Indian economic domination among other members. Cooperation 
in the trade and industrial sphere is being resisted by the 
other South Asian states under the apprehension that India 
with its relatively strong and expanding economy would 
dominate the regional market, adversely affecting their own 
developing economies. Regional cooperation in trade and 
industry would definitely accelerate development within the 
region.
The exclusion of bilateral issues from the scope of the 
SAARC has been controversial. It is these issues which form 
the main obstacles to regional cooperation in South Asia.
In this region, where politics dictate the economic policy 
of the regional states, the future success of regional 
cooperation will depend on the nature of the political 
relations between the member countries. The King of Bhutan, 
His Highness, Jigme Singhye Wangchuk, in his address to the
Summit explicitly stated, "In the geo-political realities of 
our region, it would be unrealistic to ignore the primacy of 
the political factor, as in the final analysis, it will be 
the political environment of the region that will determine 
the shape and scope of regional cooperation in South 
Asia."9 However, at the onset, it is the exclusion of 
these adverse bilateral political issues from the SAARC 
Charter which paved the way for the formation of the SAARC. 
All the member states, especially the two principle states 
of the region, India and Pakistan, insisted on the exclusion 
of these issues as a precondition to their joining the 
SAARC.
The Dhaka Summit marked the beginning of the annual 
meetings of the member states. At Dhaka, India and Pakistan 
maintained cordial relations with another with very little 
dispute during the proceedings. The Summit set the SAARC in 
motion and the members agreed to meet in Bangalore the next 
year.
THE BANGALORE SUMMIT-1986
Bilateral conflicts between India and Pakistan on the 
one hand and India and Sri Lanka on the other, overshadowed 
the proceedings of the second SAARC Summit at Bangalore in 
November 1986. The Summit opened amid reports of Indian
9Bimal Prasad, Regional Cooperation in South Asia: 
Problems and Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House 
Pvt. Ltd., 1989), 12.
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troop movements along the Indo-Pakistani border. In Sri 
Lanka, Tamil militants continued their protracted struggle 
against the. Sri Lankan armed forces. The overt sympathy and 
support for these Sri Lankan Tamils by their Indian 
counterparts seriously affected Indo-Sri Lankan relations.
The Bangalore Declaration adopted by the leaders, 
"condemned as criminal all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism.1,10 The Declaration stated that member countries 
should "refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in 
another state and that they should not acquiesce in 
organized terrorist activity within their own territory.”11 
However, the leaders were unable to agree unanimously on the 
definition of terrorism. Hence, they formulated a committee 
which was entrusted with the task of coining a suitable 
definition of "terrorism” and preparing a draft proposal 
acceptable to all members.
The member states endorsed the proposal to establish a 
committee to devise cooperation for fighting the drug 
trafficking within the region and ratified proposals 
establishing a SAARC meteorological center in India and an 
agricultural center in Bangladesh.12 The seven leaders
^Keesing^ Contemporary Archives. Vol. 32, No. 12 
(December 1986), 34815.
11Ibid.
12”South Asia: The Spirit of SAARC,” Round Table 301
(January 1987): 4.
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agreed to evolve a joint strategy on global economic issues 
at international fora.13 The principle achievement of the 
Bangalore Summit however, was the establishment of the 
permanent SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu with Bangladeshi 
diplomat, Abul Ahsan as the first Secretary-General.
Bilateral talks between India and Pakistan and the 
Indo-Sri Lankan negotiations received more publicity than 
the actual Summit proceedings. The Pakistani delegation 
claimed that nearly two hundred and fifty thousand Indian 
troops had moved closer to the Indo-Pakistani border. The 
Indian spokesmen countered the Pakistani accusations by 
declaring this troop movement as part of the Indian army*s 
annual winter exercises.14 India, on the other hand 
expressed concern over the covert Pakistani support for the 
Sikh separatists in Punjab.15
The Indo-Sri Lankan taiks on the Tamil issue took place 
under very dramatic circumstances. The Indian Government 
set free the Madras-based leaders of the Tamil separatists 
who had been placed under house-arrest before the 
inauguration of the Bangalore Summit.16 The Indian Prime 
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, tried to negotiate a peace
13Dilip Bobb and Srinivas Prasad, "SAARC: Painful 
Progress,” India Today. 15 December 1986, 65.
14,,South Asia: Spirit of the SAARC,” 4.
15Ibid.
16Salamat Ali, "Sophistry at Summitry," Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 27 November 1986, 30.
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arrangement in Sri Lanka. The Indian Air Force flew in 
three top leaders of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil 
Ealem (LTTE) to Bangalore. The Chief Minister of the Indian 
state of Tamil Nadu, M.G. Ramchandran arrived at Bangalore 
to participate in the talks.17 Prolonged negotiations took 
place behind close doors but the end results did not prove 
to be too encouraging.
The Bangalore Summit ended without any significant 
attempts at promoting economic cooperation. India's appeal 
for the inclusion of trade and industrial cooperation within 
the realm of the Charter met strong opposition from other 
members especially Pakistan.18 Even though bilateral 
negotiations are outside the scope of the Charter, the 
highlights of the Summit included the Indo-Pakistani and 
Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral talks. One might point out that 
despite the exclusion of bilateral issues from the actual 
SAARC agenda, these Summits provide a convenient opportunity 
for the leaders of the region to meet annually to discuss 
pertinent bilateral issues. At the end of the Summit it was 
evident that the viability of the SAARC as a regional body 
rested on the spirit of trust and mutual cooperation among 
the regional elites.
17Ibid.
18Bobb and Prasad, 64.
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THE KATHMANDU SUMMIT-1987
The member states present at the third SAARC Summit 
convened in Kathmandu in November 1987 signed the Kathmandu 
Declaration which included a convention for the "suppression 
of terrorism including a provision for the extradition of 
convicted terrorists.1,19 The Declaration also endorsed the 
establishment of a food security reserve for combating the 
adverse effects of natural disasters and the commissioning 
of studies on natural disasters and the protection of the 
environment.20
The Convention on Terrorism was the sole achievement of 
the third Summit. This Convention allowed the member states 
to obtain the extradition of those individuals engaged in 
acts of terrorism in other states or in cases where 
extradition was impossible, provisions formulated would 
facilitate quick trials.21 However, this Convention 
contains certain loopholes, the foremost being that the 
decision to accept the extradition requests depended on the 
discretion of the states concerned with no mechanism to 
force compliance in accordance to the provisions of the 
Convention.22
19Keesina's Record of World Events. Vol. 33, No. 12 
(December 1987), 35614.
20Ibid.
21Ron Tempest, "7 South Asian Nations Vow Joint Action on
Terrorists," Los Angeles Times. 6 November 1987, 13.
22Ibid.
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As in the previous Summit, the Kathmandu Summit 
witnessed tension between the Indian and Pakistani 
contingents. Indo-Pakistani tension aggravated by the armed 
skirmishes at the Siachen glacier, a month ago, reflected on 
the proceedings of the Summit. The possession of the 
Siachen glacier in the north-eastern part of the Indo- 
Pakistani border has led to frequent skirmishes between the 
armed forces of the two states stationed in the region. The 
member states, apart from India and Sri Lanka, expressed 
concern over the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987 and the 
presence of the Indian forces in Jaffna. They were 
apprehensive at the prospect of India assuming the role of a 
"regional policeman" and involving itself in the 
maintenance of domestic law and order of the South Asian 
states.23 In fact for the first time since its inception 
in 1985, the SAARC openly discussed a bilateral issue in the 
main Summit proceedings. President Jayawardene1s reference 
to the Accord led to heated discussion of bilateral issues. 
Pakistan refused to endorse the Indian proposal for an 
official SAARC statement on Sri Lanka.24
Another controversial issue was Afghanistan's 
application for SAARC membership. This issue became a bone 
of contention between India and Pakistan. India, the sole
23Ibid.
24Salamat Ali, "Smoothed-Over Summit," Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 19 November 1987, 39.
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supporter of the application was opposed by other SAARC 
members led by Pakistan. Zain Noorani, Pakistan's Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs stated that, "while there could 
be no objection to the admission of Afghanistan as a nation, 
the country being currently under Soviet occupation, could 
hardly qualify."25 India retaliated by vetoing the 
Pakistani proposal to grant observer status to the ASEAN.26
Other issues causing controversies included the 
Bangladeshi proposal for cooperation in the development of 
water resources and Pakistan's proposal for a South Asian 
treaty banning nuclear weapons. India vetoed both 
proposals. On the question of economic cooperation, Mr. 
Noorani reiterated Pakistan's stance on the issue by 
pointing out that political normalization had to precede 
economic cooperation.27
A distinguishing feature of the Kathmandu Summit was 
the plethora of bilateral meetings. Apart from the main 
Summit meeting, twenty-one mini summits were held among the 
seven leaders.28 Once again bilateral talks received top 
billing compared to the Summit. Kathmandu provided the 
ideal meeting ground for talks between the Indian Prime
25Ibid.
26Raminder Singh, "Gang up on Big Brother," India Today. 
30 November 1987, 33.
27Salamat Ali, "Smoothed-Over Summit," 40.
28Singh, 33.
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Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and his Pakistani counterpart, 
Mohammed Khan Junejo.
The Kathmandu Summit demonstrated that the success of 
the SAARC depended on the relations between India and 
Pakistan. The open hostility between these two powers 
marred the Summit proceedings. The other members took sides 
depending on their respective interests and the SAARC forum 
witnessed a clash of wills and extensive political 
manouverings. Although, the other members are reluctant to 
admit it there is no doubt that the SAARC's future as a 
viable body depended on the normalization of relations 
between India and Pakistan.
THE ISLAMABAD SUMMIT-1988
The Islamabad Summit proved to be the most successful 
Summit held to date. This success is attributed to the 
cordial relations between arch rivals— India and Pakistan. 
The Summit allowed Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and 
the newly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto 
to meet for the first time to discuss not only SAARC issues 
but also negotiate on bilateral conflicts. In fact, the 
SAARC Summit had to take a back seat to Indo-Pakistan talks. 
International and regional media attention was focussed on 
the Gandhi-Bhutto talks. A Bangladeshi diplomat even 
complained that the other members "were made to feel like
77
part-players."29
The Islamabad Declaration, signed on 31 December 1988, 
called for joint efforts to combat terrorism in the region 
and dedicated 1989 to fighting drug abuse and drug 
trafficking.30 The members also accepted the Pakistani 
proposal to launch the "SAARC 2000" regional plan which 
would include areas such as food, clothing, shelter, 
education and primary health.31 The members agreed to open 
the membership of the SAARC to all states within the region 
and entrusted the Secretariat to come up with a suitable 
definition of the boundaries of "South Asia." A major 
achievement was the abolition of visa restrictions for the 
legislators and judges of member states. This privilege may 
later be extended to journalists, bureaucrats and others.32 
The members lauded the efforts of the youth volunteer 
programs and the establishment of SAARC chairs, fellowships 
and scholarship scheme. This scheme highlights the 
importance of cooperation in education within the region.33 
The Summit participants called for an end to the
29Shekhar Gupta, "Fourth SAARC Summit: Coming of Age," 
India Today. 31 January 1989, 24.
^Keesinq's Record of World Events. Vol. 35, No. 2 
(February 1989), 36485.
31Salamat Ali, "A Hint of Hope," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 12 January 1989, 11.
32"SAARC Summit: Islamabad Declaration," Strategic Digest
Vol. 19, No. 2 (February 1989): 60.
33Ibid.
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proliferation of nuclear weapons, both at the global and 
regional levels.
At Islamabad, the cordiality between India and Pakistan 
reflected itself in the SAARC proceedings, which went on 
smoothly without any protests or accusations from either 
side. In earlier Summits the animosity between India and 
Pakistan had overshadowed the proceedings. This emerging 
amicable relationship between India and Pakistan raised 
hopes about the success of SAARC.
The Islamabad Summit provided the opportunity for the 
first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan after 
nearly three decades. The friendly atmosphere of the 
Gandhi-Bhutto talks definitely raised public expectations of 
future amity between India and Pakistan. Safdar Mahmood, a 
Lahore-based columnist summarized, "the ultimate success of 
the SAARC largely depends on the kind of relationship that 
develops between India and Pakistan.1,34
THE MALE SUMMIT-1990
The contentious bilateral issues between India and Sri 
Lanka led to the cancellation of the 1989 Summit, scheduled 
to be held at Colombo. Sri Lanka formally declared that it 
would not hold the Summit as long as the Indian troops
34Quoted in Gupta, 23.
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remained on Sri Lankan soil.35
The fifth Summit was finally held in November 1990 in 
Male, the capital of Maldives. The Summit was held amid 
great internal and external turmoil in most of the member 
states. Four of the member states— India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka and Nepal— had new governments.36 Changes in 
government in India and Pakistan coincided with the 
worsening of the Kashmir situation. This Summit like other 
SAARC Summits provided the opportunity for talks between the 
two rivals.
The Male Declaration called for the extension of the 
SAARC activities to the core areas of "economic cooperation, 
biotechnology, environmental issues and tourism.”37 The 
leaders agreed to observe the 1990s as the "Decade of the 
Girl Child” in accordance with the recommendations of the 
September 1990 World Summit for Children.38 The member 
nations endorsed proposals to create a regional 
documentation center in India, a human resources development 
center in Pakistan and a tuberculosis treatment center in
35Keesinats Record of World Events. Vol. 36, No. 3 
(March 1990), 37357.
36Barbara Crossett, "South Asian Nations in Turmoil Will 
Meet,” The New York Times. 21 November 1990, p A7 (L).
37Keesinals Record of World Events. Vol. 36, No. 11
(November 1990), 37857.
38Ibid.
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Nepal.39 In the international field, members criticized 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and called for the restoration 
of the Kuwaiti Government.40
The first meeting of the newly appointed Prime 
Ministers of India and Pakistan, Chandrasekhar and Nawaz 
Sharif, received maximum press coverage. The leaders met 
for talks at Male and agreed to hold further talks at the 
ministerial level in December.41 However the Male meetings 
of the two powers did not lead to any treaties or other 
formal negotiations. The Male Summit went off as scheduled 
but without any outstanding achievement.
CONCLUSION
A review of the first five SAARC Summits make one fact 
abundantly clear. Despite the exclusion of bilateral issues 
from the scope of the Charter, it is these issues that chart 
the difficult course of the SAARC. These bilateral 
relations are dependent on elite rapport. Hostile relations 
between India and Sri Lanka led to the postponement and 
finally the cancellation of the Colombo Summit. The 
relation between Indian and Pakistani elites is the
39Ibid.
40Barbara Crossett, "South Asian Leaders Call for Efforts 
Against Drugs,” The New York Times. 25 November 1990, p 21 
(L).
41K.T.R. Menon, ”Indo-Pak talks from December 18,” The 
Times of India. 23 November 1990, 7.
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principle indicator of the success or failure of the of 
these Summits. In Bangalore and Kathmandu, Indo-Pakistani 
strife reflected itself in every aspect of the proceedings 
whereas the close rapport between the elites of the two 
nations in Islamabad, led to a relatively amicable Summit.
The viability of the SAARC rests on the solution of 
bilateral political conflicts among SAARC members, 
especially India and Pakistan. While the SAARC Summits are 
often overshadowed by simultaneously held bilateral talks, 
one cannot deny the importance of these talks. These 
bilateral negotiations are extremely important and may 
ultimately lead to the solution of long-standing political 
problems. The Summits provide the much-needed vehicle for 
the leaders to meet and communicate at regular intervals in 
a diplomatic atmosphere. The growing necessity and the 
importance of these annual Summits cannot be denied.
CONCLUSION
In 1985, the institutionalization of regional 
cooperation in South Asia in the form of the SAARC received 
accolades all over the world. The main objective of the 
SAARC is socio-economic development of the poverty-stricken 
South Asian region. Another important objective is the 
promotion of mutual trust among the often feuding South 
Asian states. However, the functioning of the SAARC over 
the past years has shown that it is difficult to promote 
socio-economic cooperation among states with long-standing 
political disputes reinforced by antagonistic relations 
among the ruling elites of the member states.
The theoretical framework laid out in the first chapter 
argues that at the formative stages of any organization for 
regional cooperation, politics will play a major role. At 
the onset, political cooperation is necessary to create the 
environment necessary for economic cooperation. Once 
economic cooperation is firmly established, these economic 
relations may prevent further political discord. Scholars 
like Karl Deutsch, Jacob Viner, Robert Gilpin, Constantine 
Vaitsos, Mohammed Ayoob and Partha Ghosh have all stressed 
the importance of political factors in the success or
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failure of regional cooperation. Political cooperation 
essentially means rapport among the regional elite. This 
rapport depends on similar political perspectives and common 
threat perceptions.
Regional cooperation in South Asia developed over a 
number of years. Since the end of colonial rule, regional 
leaders, especially Jawaharlal Nehru, espoused regional 
cooperation for the development of South Asia. The mistrust 
generated by the Partition and the advent of Cold War 
politics, however led to a widening of the rift among the 
regional elites. This elite antagonism, a result of the 
absence of common political and strategic perspectives, 
proved to be the principal barrier to development of 
regional cooperation in South Asia.
The success of the 1980 Bangladesh Proposal was a 
result of the consensus among the regional elites for the 
formation of a body to promote regional cooperation.
However, a point to be kept in mind is that both India and 
Pakistan accepted this Proposal very reluctantly, though it 
was endorsed eagerly by Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal 
and Sri Lanka.
The discord among the elites prevalent in South Asia 
is augmented by and reflected in the presence of numerous 
bilateral disputes. These contentious bilateral issues have 
made for bitter relations among the regional elites. Hence, 
from its very inception the SAARC has been extremely
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politicized. Different political perspectives, generated 
initially by Partition, are reinforced by the presence of 
bilateral disputes. The Indocentric nature of South Asia 
gives rise to the fear of Indian hegemony over the region on 
the part of the smaller states. This Indophobia, 
fortified by the existence of the various bilateral 
disputes, has generated mistrust among the regional elite 
and every Indian move (action or inaction) is viewed with 
suspicion.
The relationship between India and Pakistan is of 
primary importance. It is this relationship which holds the 
key to the success of the SAARC. A review of the SAARC 
summit proceedings reveals that the Indo-Pakistani 
relationship affects the success or failure of these summits 
directly. The Summits at Bangalore (1986) and the Kathmandu 
(1987) suffered from the confrontations between the members 
of the two delegations. The Islamabad Summit (1988), marked 
by a close rapport between the Indian and the Pakistani 
contingent, was the most successful SAARC Summit to date.
The relationship between bilateral disputes and the 
lack of elite harmony can be easily discerned from the study 
of the political relations in South Asia. Mutual 
understanding and trust among the elites have been conducive 
for the socio-economic development within the region. The 
rapport between the Indian government under Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi and the regime of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman of Bangladesh
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is one example. Indian help in the 1971 War of Liberation 
in East Pakistan helped in the creation of Bangladesh. This 
infant nation was nurtured by India in the early years of 
its existence. Indo-Bangladesh cooperation extended to many 
fields including trade, commerce, industry and others.
After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975, Indo- 
Bangladesh relations deteriorated rapidly. Mrs. Gandhi's 
antipathy towards the post-Mujib regimes was reflected in 
her apprehensions about the efficacy of the SAARC.
A more recent example of elite rapport and its effects 
on cooperation in South Asia can be seen in the Indo-Sri 
Lankan relations over the Tamil issue. Initial suspicions 
and allegations of Indian support for the LTTE made by the 
Jayawardene Government soon gave way to mutual understanding 
leading to the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in 
1987. By 1989, however, this elite harmony had 
disintegrated. The Goverment of newly elected President 
Premadasa resented the presence of the IPKF and demanded the 
withdrawal of all Indian troops. This demand antagonized 
the Indian Government and soon a confrontational situation 
developed which ultimately led to the cancellation of the 
1989 SAARC Summit scheduled to be held in Colombo, the 
capital of Sri Lanka.
In the regional relations of South Asia, the primacy of 
political relations over economic relations is quite 
apparent. The Partition of the country, tore apart the
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well-integrated economy of British India. Political and 
strategic considerations forced the elites of the newly 
created states to shun interdependence and seek to build 
independent economies. The complementary nature of the 
regional economies was deliberately severed by the elite for 
political reasons. At present, political discord prevents 
the implementation of schemes which are economically 
beneficial to the SAARC members. The proposed Ganges water 
sharing scheme between Bangladesh, India and Nepal is a good 
example. The hydro-power potential of such a scheme could 
help solve the energy crisis in the region and abate the 
growing dependence on foreign oil. But political concerns 
prevent the implementation of this hydro-power project. The 
reluctance exhibited by the Indian Government to accept the 
scheme shows that economic benefits are subordinated to 
political necessities.
At present, the SAARC is functioning more as a forum 
for diplomatic activity than as an actual body promoting 
cooperation. SAARC activities, burdened by regional 
political disputes, remain low-keyed. The future of the 
SAARC rests precariously on elite rapport especially on the 
relationship between India and Pakistan. An increase in 
political conflicts within the region exacerbates the 
prevailing mistrust and weighs down the activities and 
functioning of the SAARC.
The fruitful development of regional cooperation
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depends primarily on political cooperation stemming from 
rising levels of rapport among the regional elite as in the 
case of the Islamabad Summit. The South Asian case study 
clearly shows that it is the presence or absence of 
understanding among the regional elites which increases or 
decreases the level of cooperation. The presence of a 
harmonious political environment encourages the development 
of socio-economic development within a region. Political 
cooperation is an indispensable pre-condition for the 
success of regional economic cooperation, and ultimately, 
regional integration.
APPENDIX A
CHARTER OF THE SOUTH ASIAN 
ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION
We, the Heads of State or Government of BANGLADESH, BHUTAN, 
INDIA, MALDIVES, NEPAL, PAKISTAN and SRI LANKA:
1. Desirous of promoting peace, stability, amity and 
progress in the region through strict adherence to the 
principles of the UNITED NATIONS CHARTER and NON-ALIGNMENT, 
particularly respect for the principles of sovereign 
equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non­
use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other States and peaceful settlement of all disputes;
2. Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, 
the objectives of peace, freedom, social justice and 
economic prosperity are best achieved in the SOUTH ASIAN 
region by fostering mutual understanding, good neighborly 
relations and meaningful cooperation among the Member States 
which are bound by ties of history and culture;
3. Aware of the common problems, interests and aspirations 
of the peoples of SOUTH ASIA and the need for joint action 
and enhanced cooperation within their respective political 
and economic systems and cultural traditions;
4. Convinced that regional cooperation among the countries 
of SOUTH ASIA is mutually beneficial, desirable and 
necessary for promoting the welfare and improving the 
quality of life of the peoples of the region;
5. Convinced further that economic, social and technical 
cooperation among the countries of SOUTH ASIA would 
contribute significantly to national and collective self- 
reliance;
6. Recognising that increased cooperation, contacts and 
exchanges among the countries of the region will contribute 
to the promotion of friendship and understanding among their 
peoples;
7. Recalling the DECLARATION signed by their Foreign 
Ministers in NEW DELHI on August 2, 1983 and noting the 
progress achieved in regional cooperation;
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8. Reaffirming their determination to promote such 
cooperation within an institutional framework;
DO HEREBY
AGREE to establish an organisation to be known as SOUTH 
ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION hereinafter 
referred to as the ASSOCIATION with the following 
objectives, principles, institutional and financial 
arrangements:
ARTICLE I 
OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the ASSOCIATION shall be:-
(a) to promote the welfare of the peoples of SOUTH ASIA and 
to improve their quality of life;
(b) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and 
cultural development in the region and to provide all 
individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to 
realise their full potentials;
(c) to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among 
the countries of SOUTH ASIA;
(d) to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and 
appreciation of one another's problems;
(e) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in 
the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific 
fields;
(f) to strengthen cooperation among themselves in 
international forums on matters of common interests; and
(g) to cooperate with international and regional 
organisations with similar aims and purposes.
ARTICLE II 
PRINCIPLES
1. Cooperation within the framework of the ASSOCIATION shall 
be based on respect for the principles of sovereign 
equality7 territorial integrity, political independence, 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and 
mutual benefits.
2. Such cooperation shall not be a substitute for bilateral 
and multilateral obligations.
ARTICLE III 
MEETING OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT
The Heads of State or Government shall meet once a year or 
more often as and when considered necessary by the member 
States.
ARTICLE IV 
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
A Council of Ministers consisting of the Foreign Ministers 
of the Member States shall be established with the following
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functions ?
(a) formulation of the policies of the ASSOCIATION;
(b) review of the progress of cooperation under the 
ASSOCIATION;
(c) decision on new areas of cooperation?
(d) establishment of additional mechanism under the 
ASSOCIATION as deemed necessary;
(e) decision on other matters of general interest to the 
ASSOCIATION.
The Council of Ministers shall meet twice a year. 
Extraordinary session of the Council may be held by 
agreement among the Member States.
ARTICLE V 
STANDING COMMITTEE
The Standing Committee comprising the Foreign Secretaries 
shall have the following functions?
(a) overall monitoring and coordination of programme of
cooperation?
(b) approval of projects and programmes, and the modalities 
of their financing?
(c) determination of inter-sectoral priorities?
(d) mobilisation of regional and external resources;
(e) identification of new areas of cooperation based on 
appropriate studies.
The Standing Committee shall meet as often as deemed 
necessary.
The Standing Committee shall submit periodic reports to the 
Council of Ministers and make reference to it as and when 
necessary for decisions on policy matters.
ARTICLE VI 
TECHNICAL COMMITTEES
Technical Committees comprising representatives of Member 
States shall be responsible for the implementation, 
coordination and monitoring of the programmes in their 
respective areas of cooperation.
They shall have the following terms and reference:
(a) determination of the potential and scope of regional 
cooperation in agreed areas?
(b) formulation of programmes and preparation of projects?
(c) determination of financial implications of sectoral 
programmes ?
(d) formulation of recommendations regarding apportionment 
costs;
(e) implementation and coordination of sectoral programmes?
(f) monitoring of progress in implementation.
The Technical Committee shall submit periodic reports to the 
Standing Committee.
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The Chairmanship of the Technical Committees shall rotate 
among Member States in alphabetical order every two 
years.
The Technical Committees may, inter-alia, use the following 
mechanisms and modalities, if and when considered necessary:
(a) meetings of heads of national technical agencies;
(b) meetings of experts in specific fields:
(c) contact amongst recognised centres of excellence in the 
region.
ARTICLE VII 
ACTION COMMITTEES
The Standing Committee may set up Action Committees 
comprising Member States concerned with the implementation 
of projects involving more than two but not all Member 
States.
ARTICLE VIII 
SECRETARIAT
There shall be a Secretariat of the ASSOCIATION.
ARTICLE IX 
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
1) The contribution of each Member State towards financing 
of the activities of the ASSOCIATION shall be voluntary.
2) Each Technical Committee shall make recommendations for 
the apportionment of costs of implementing the programmes 
proposed by it.
3) In case sufficient financial resources cannot be 
mobilised within the region for funding activities of the 
ASSOCIATION, external financing from appropriate sources may 
be mobilised with the approval of or by the Standing 
Committee.
ARTICLE X 
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of 
unanimity.
Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the 
deliberations.
IN FAITH WHEREOF We Have Set Out Hands And Seals Hereunto.
DONE IN DHAKA, BANGLADESH, On This The Eighth Day of 
December Of The Year One Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Five.
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